Georgia State University College of Law

Reading Room
Georgia Business Court Opinions
10-7-2020

J.P. CAREY ENTERPRISES AMENDED ORDER ON CROSS
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Kelly Lee Ellerbee

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations Law
Commons, and the Contracts Commons

Fulton County Superior Court
““EFILED***AC
Date: 10/7/2020 3:58 PM
Cathelene Robinson, Clerk

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA
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Defendant.

AMENDED ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Court hereby amends the Order on Cross Motions for Summary
Judgment, entered October 1, 2020, solely for the purpose ofproviding a complete
version of the Court’s ruling as the order originally entered was inadvertently
missing a page. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(g).
This dispute involving a convertible promissory and the enforceability of its
default remedies comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed January 24, 2020 (“Plaintiff's Motion”) and Defendant Cuentas’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed January 24, 2020 (““Defendant’s Motion”). A
hearing on Plaintiff's Motion and Defendant’s Motion was held on September 30,
2020. Having reviewed the record and considered the arguments and submissions

of counsel, the Court enters the following order.

1. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the movantis entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Gervin v. Retail
Prop. Tr., 354 Ga. App. 11, 11 (2020) citing Edwards v. Moore, 351 Ga. App. 147
(2019). “In an action on a promissory note, a claimant mayestablish a primafacie
right to judgment as a matter of law by producingthe promissory note and showing
that it was executed. On a motion for summary judgment, the burden then shifts to
the obligorto establish an affirmative defenseto the claim.” (Citation omitted.) 280
Partners, LLC v. Bank of N. Georgia, 352 Ga. App. 605, 608 (2019); see generally
Pure Hospitality Sols., Inc. v. Canouse, 347 Ga. App. 592 (2018) (convertible note
allowing the holder to convert its debt into equity of the obligor described as a as a
promissory note).

2. FINDINGS OF FACT
2.1. Convertible Nature of Note
Thekeyfacts regarding the note andits execution are undisputed. On January
2, 2017, Next Group Holdings, Inc. (“Next Group Holdings”), predecessor of
Defendant Cuentas, Inc. (hereinafter collectively, “Cuentas”), entered into a
convertible promissory note with Plaintiff J.P. Carey Enterprises, Inc. (“JPC”) in

which Cuentas agreed to pay JPC the principal amount of $70,000.00 (“Note”).
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(Defendant’s SUMF, { 1, Ex. 2-Note; Plaintiffs Resp. SUMF ]]1.)! Interest accrued
on the Note’s outstandingprincipal at 8% per annum,and the Note matured in seven
months, on August 2, 2017. (Id., p. 1; § 4(b).) The Note wasentered as part of a

deal to resolve a $66,000.00 Florida judgmentlien entered against Cuentas. (Id., §1;
Plaintiff's SUMF, {| 2, Ex. C; Defendant’s Resp. SUMF, § 2). The parties expressly
agreed the Note would be governed by Georgia law. (Note, §14.)
The Note was convertible in that it allowed JPC to transform any outstanding
debt owed into an equity interest of Cuentas. Specifically, it allowed JPC the option,
“at any time, to convert all or any amountofthe principal face amountof[the] Note
then outstanding into shares of [Cuentas’s] commonstock... .” (Id., §4(a).) The
Note established a procedure and a price formula for any such conversion. (Id.) JPC
would initiate the transfer by providing notice to Cuentas or its designated transfer
agent (“Notice of Conversion”). (Id.)

The conversion price would equal 50% of

the lowest trading price for Cuentas’s commonstock for twenty prior trading days
including the day on which the Notice of Conversion wasreceived, with a floor of
$0.02 per share (“Standard Conversion Formula”). (Id.) Cuentasorits transfer agent
wasto deliver the converted shares to JPC within three business daysofreceiving a
Notice of Conversion.(Id.)

' A copy ofthe Note is attached to Defendant’s SUMF as Ex. 2. Hereinafter, record citations will refer simply to
the Note.
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Interest accrued on the principal balance was also subject to conversion
(“Interest Shares”).

[JPC] may, at any time, send in a Notice of Conversion to [Cuentas] for
Interest Shares based onthe formula provided [for conversionsof principal].
The dollar amount converted into Interest Shares shall be all or a portion of
the accrued interest calculated on the unpaid principal balanceofthis Note to
the date of such notice.

(id., §4(b).)
Tofacilitate a conversion, Cuentas wasto appointa transfer agent and provide
it with “irrevocable” instructions to reserveat least 10,000,000 sharesof its common

stock (“Share Reserve”). (Id., §12.)

Cuentas was further required to “reserve a

minimum offour times the amountof shares required if the [Note] would be fully
converted.” (Id.) In the event ofa conversion, Cuentaswas‘to payall transfer agent
costs associated with the issuing and delivering the share certificates to [JPC]. If
such amounts are to be paid by [JPC], it may deduct such amounts from the
Conversion Price.” (Id.)
2.2 Events of Default and Remedies under the Note
The Note outlined a number of events triggering a default, including the
general failure to abide by anyofits terms or provisions. (Id., § 8.) The failure to
timely (within three business days) provide JPC with commonstockafter receiving
a Notice of Conversion was expressly deemed an eventofdefault. (Id., §8 (k).)

The Note details a host of remedies for Cuentas’s breach. Generally, unless
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an event of default is cured within five days, JPC could “consider this Note
immediately due and payable” and pursue anyof its available remedies. (Id., § 8.)
Uponan event ofdefault, interest began to accrue at “24% per annum or. . at the
highest rate of interest permitted by law” (“Default Interest”). (Id.)

An event of

default altered all three elements of the Standard Conversion Formula — increasing
the conversion discount from 50% to 60%, extending the lookback period for a low
share price from twenty to twenty-five days and eliminating the $0.02 price per share
floor (“Default Conversion Formula”). (Id., § 4(a).)

An event of default also

triggered Cuentas’s obligation to pay JPC its attorney’s fees and other costs of
collection. (Id., § 8.)
The Noteoutlines two specific remedies should Cuentasbreachthe obligation
to timely deliver stock in response to a Notice of Conversion. First, for a late
delivery, the Note expressly imposed a “penalty” of $250 per day beginning on the
fourth day after a Notice of Conversion was delivered to Cuentas and increasing to
$500 per day beginning on the tenth day (“Failure to Deliver Daily Penalty”). (Id.)
Second, the Note provides a “Make-Whole for Failure to Deliver Loss” remedy
(“Make Whole Remedy’’) providing:
[a]t [JPC]’s election, if [Cuentas] fails for any reason to deliver to [JPC] the
conversion shares by the by the [sic] 3" business day following the delivery
of a Notice of Conversion to [Cuentas] andif [JPC] incurs a Failure to Deliver
Loss, then at any time [JPC] may provide [Cuentas] written notice indicating
the amounts payable to [JPC] in respect of the Failure to Deliver Loss and
[Cuentas] must make [JPC] whole as follows:
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Failure to Deliver Loss = [(Hightrade price at any time onorafter the
day of exercise) x (Numberof conversion shares)].
[Cuentas] must pay the Failure to Deliver Loss by cash payment, and any
such cash payment must be madebythe third business day from the time of
[JPC]’s written notice to [Cuentas].

(Id.)
Approximately one week after the Note was executed, JPC andits lawyer
received a letter whereby Cuentasappointedits transfer agent and established a share
reserve of 3,500,000 shares. (Defendant’s Resp. to Plaintiff's SUMF, Ex. 6A, pp.
171-172, Ex. 14). JPC never objected that Cuentas had not complied with its Share
Reserve requirements under the Note. (Id.)
The Note contains a non-waiverclause stating that none ofits terms “may be
amended, waived, discharged or terminatedother than by written instrumentsigned”
by both parties. (Note, § 10). Anotherprovision allowed JPC to enforce any ofits
remediesunless it had provided a written waiverof a default.

(Id., § 8).

2.3 JPC’s Efforts at Conversion
On April 13, 2017, JPC delivered a Notice of Conversion to Cuentas’s transfer

agent seeking to convert $71,549.59 of the Note into 3,577,480 shares of Cuentas’s
common stock, the entire amount due and owing under the Note: $70,000.00 in
principal and $1,549.59 in interest at the non-default rate of 8%, using the Standard

Conversion Formula of $0.02 per share. (Plaintiff's SUMF, §§ 31 and 32, Ex. Land
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N;? Defendant’s Resp. SUMF, {31 and 32.) Theinterest wascalculated beginning
from issuance of the Note until the April 13, 2017 Notice of Conversion. (Id., Ex.
N). This effort at conversion triggered an e-mail exchange between the transfer
agent, JPC, and Cuentas that continued over several weeks until the conversion was

completed in early July 2017. (Id., Ex. M).
On April 17, 2017, the transfer agent replied to JPC, requesting a $250.00
conversion fee. (Plaintiff's SUMF, § 36, Ex. M at p. C_0326; Defendant’s Resp.
SUMF, {| 36.) JPC responded it would needto recalculate the conversion notice to
accountfor the fee which it would then charge back to Cuentas. (Plaintiff's SUMEF,
4 37, Ex. M at p. C_0334; Defendant’s Resp. SUMF, 937.) The transfer agent also
informed JPC that it was only holding 3,500,000 million shares in the Share Reserve

and inquired whether JPC wanted to submit a revised conversion form for that
numberof sharesor ask the transfer agent to request consent from Cuentas to issue
an additional 77,480 shares. (Id. at p. C_0328.)
On April 27, 2017, JPC sent an updated Notice of Conversion that accounted

for the transfer agent’s fee as well as additional interest that had accrued since the
April 13, 2017 Notice of Conversion. (Plaintiff's SUMF, § 38, Ex M at p. C_0334;
Ex. O; Defendant’s Resp. SUMF, § 38.)

It sought to convert $72,014.38 into

3,600,720 shares of Cuentas’s common stock, again using the Note’s Standard

> See also Defendant’s SUMF, 4 5, Ex. 3 and 4; Plaintiff's Resp. SUMF, § 5.
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Conversion Formula andits 8% non-default interest rate. (Plaintiff's SUMF, {38
and 39, Ex. O and P; Defendant’s Resp. J] 38 and 39.) Specifically, it sought to
convert: $70,000.00 in outstanding principal, $1,764.38 in accrued interest for the
entire span of the Note, and the $250.00 transfer fee. (Id., Ex. O at p. C_1999). On
April 27, 2017, May 3, 2017, May 5, 2017 and June 29, 2017, the transfer agent
reminded JPC only 3,500,000 shares were held in the Share Reserve and asked JPC

if it would accept that numberofshares or request authorization for Cuentas to issue
an additional 100,720 shares or increase the Share Reserve. (Plaintiff's SUMF f]
40-44, Ex. M at pp. C_0337; C_0343; Defendant’s Resp. SUMF, {ff 40-44.)
On June 29, 2017, JPC requested the available shares stating, “I will deal
[with] rest and opinion later” and the transfer agent requested JPC provide a revised
Notice of Conversion.

(Plaintiff's SUMF, J 46; Ex. R at p. C_1891 and Ex. M at

pp. C_0344-C_0345; Defendant’s Resp. SUMF, 7 46.) However, the next day, on
June 30, 2017, before receiving a revised notice, the transfer agent expressly asked
Cuentasfor authorization to issue additional shares. (Plaintiff's SUMF, ] 47, Ex. M

and Ex. S at p. C_0347; Defendant’s Resp. SUMF, { 47.) JPC joined in the request,
reminding Cuentas the Note called for 10,000,000 shares to be placed in the Share
Reserve, and asking Cuentas “to authorize the issuance” of the additional shares.
(Id. at p. C_0348.) The JPC representativestated, “[i]f this is not agreeable I amstill
demanding that at a minimum the 3.5 [million] shares be sent immediately.” (Id.)
Page 8 of 26

On July 1, 2017, Cuentas authorized issuance of the remaining 100,720 shares

necessary to comply with JPC’s April 27, 2017 Notice of Conversion. (Id. at p.
C_0355.)

(Id.) JPC was informed andits agent indicated his thanks. (Id.)

All

3,600,720 shares were received by JPC by July 5, 2017. (Plaintiff's SUMF, § 48;
Defendant’s Resp. SUMF, { 48; Defendant’s SUMF, § 6, Ex. 5; Plaintiff's Resp.

SUMF, 7 6.) JPC subsequently sold those shares for $89,263.32. (Defendant’s
SUMF, 79, Ex. 6, pp. 142-144, Ex. 7; Plaintiff's Resp. SUMF, 99.)
Cuentas does not concede it breached the Note.
Defendant’s Motion, n. 1.)

(Brief in Support of

However, this Court finds no dispute that a breach

occurred due to the failure of Cuentas to maintain the required Share Reserve or to
timely respond to JPC’s Notice of Conversion.
On December 1, 2017, approximately five months after the aforementioned
conversion was completed, JPC made a demand upon Cuentasfor “penalties due”
pursuant to the Note based upon Cuentas’s breaches. (Defendant’s SUMF, Ex.6 at
p. 211-215; Ex. 10.) The demand calculated amounts purportedly owed under the
Default Conversion Formula, Failure to Deliver Daily Penalty, and Make Whole
Remedy, applying Default Interest to each category,resulting in a total “penalty”
figure of $305,368.63. (Id., Ex. 10 at p. C_1959.)
2.4

The Lawsuit

JPC filed a lawsuit against Next Group Holdingsin Florida, seeking to collect
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on the default provisions of the Note, but that action was voluntarily dismissed on
October 18, 2018. (Defendant’s Mot. to Strike, Ex. 1; Plaintiff's Resp. to Mot. to
Strike, p. 2.) The Note contains a forum selection clause consenting to the exclusive
jurisdiction of state or federal courts sitting in Fulton County Georgia. (Note, § 14).
JPC filed its original Verified Complaint against Next Group Holdings in this Court
on December 14, 2018, asserting a claim for breach of contract, an alternative claim

for specific performance, and two claims seeking to recover attorney’s fees. JPC’s
complaint sought liquidated damagesin excess of $1.1 million including recovery
under the Default Conversion Formula, Failure to Deliver Daily Penalty, and the
Make Whole Remedy as well as Default Interest. (Verified Complaint, J 33.) On
May 14, 2019, Plaintiff's Amended Verified Complaint was filed.

It was

substantially similar to the initial Complaint but named Cuentas, Inc., New Group
Holdings’ successor, as Defendant. On January 15, 2020, JPC filed a Notice of
Amendmentto Plaintiffs Amended Verified Complaint, withdrawingall allegations
seeking to recover the Failure to Deliver Daily Penalty. The one-page amendment
also changed the amountofPlaintiff's damages from a specified sum to “an amount
to be provenattrial, but not less than one million dollars.”

At the conclusion of discovery, the parties filed the cross motions for
summary judgment now before the Court. JPC seeks to enforce the Note and now
asserts the amountofits liquidated damages exceeds $54 million. (Plaintiffs Mot.,
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pp. 16-17.) Cuentas argues the Note’s Default Conversion Formula, Make Whole
Remedy and Default Interest constitute impermissible penalties and are thus
unenforceable. (Defendant’s Mot., p. 1; Defendant’s Resp. to Plaintiffs Mot., pp.
10-12.) Alternatively, Cuentas contends JPC waived any of these remedies by
seeking and obtaining Cuentas’s performance under the non-default provisions of
the Note after learning of Cuentas’s default. (Defendant’s Mot., p. 16; Defendant’s
Resp. to Plaintiff's Mot., pp. 2-10.)

3. ANALYSIS
3.1

Standards Governing the Review of Liquidated
Damage Contract Provisions

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-6-7, “[i]f the parties agree in their contract what
the damages for a breach shall be, they are said to be liquidated and, unless the
agreementviolates someprinciple of law,the parties are bound thereby.” However,
as case law provides,this statute will not serve to enforce a penalty camouflaged as
a liquidated damage provision. A contract term “that is intended to deter breaches
of the contract by imposing a penalty for a breach that is not a reasonable preestimation of damages is unenforceable under Georgia law.” West Asset Mgnt.,
Inc. v. NW Parkway, LLC, 336 Ga. App. 775, 784 (2016) citing Southeastern Land
Fund, Inc. v. Real Estate World, Inc., 237 Ga. 227, 230 (1976).

Georgia has

established a three-part test for analyzing whether a liquidated damages provision

should be considered an unenforceable penalty: (1) the injury caused by the breach
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mustbe difficult or impossible of accurate estimation; (2) the parties must intend to
provide for damages rather than for a penalty; and (3) the sum stipulated must be a
reasonable pre-estimate of the probableloss. Id.
The burden of proving a liquidated damages clause is an unenforceable
penalty rests upon the party who defaults on the agreement. West Asset Mgmt. at
784-785. The defaulting party carries this burden by demonstrating a failure in any
one of the three factors.

Caincare, Inc. v. Ellison, 272 Ga. App. 190, 192 (2005).

“The enforceability of a liquidated damages provision in a contract is a question of
law for the court which necessarily requires the resolution of questionsoffact.” Id.
(citation omitted.) “In cases of doubt, the courts favorthe construction of a contract
whichholdsthe stipulated sum to be a penalty, and limits the recovery to the amount
of damagesactually shown,rather than a liquidation of the damages.” West Asset
Mgmt. at 785 (citation and punctuation omitted.)
3.2

Application of Georgia’s Three-Part Test to the Make Whole
Remedy and Default Conversion Formula

Initially, the Court considers the enforceability of the Note’s Default
Conversion Formula and the Make Whole Remedy.
Thefirst factor of Georgia’s three-part analysis requires the Court to consider
whether the damages caused by the breach aredifficult or impossible to estimate.
Longstanding Georgia law holds damages owedfor the contractualfailure to deliver
stock is the difference between the purchase price and the “actual market value of
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the stock at the time when delivery should have been made. . .” Brandt v. Buckley,
27 Ga. App. 515, 519 (1921). Brandt further asserts, “[t]he claim of the buyer for
damages for the failure of the seller to make delivery is ordinarily a claim for
unliquidated damages. . .” Id. (emphasis added.)
Based upon the unique nature of a convertible note, JPC argues the
unpredictability of the market for Cuentas stock renders an estimation of damages
impossible.

(Plaintiff's Resp. to Defendant’s Mot., pp. 7-8.)

Specifically, it

contends, “the volatility of [Cuentas’s] stock price is the very reason the Note
required [Cuentas] to promptly satisfy a conversion request; any significant delay in
honoring [JPC’s] request would subject [JPC] to unpredictable future market
gyrations.” (Id. at p. 9; see also Canouse Aff., JJ 47, 55, 61). Georgia courts have
not specifically addressed whether the damagesfor breach of a convertible note for
failure to timely deliver the stock are difficult or impossible to accurately estimate.
However, the issue has been the subject of several recent federal court decisions

applying New York law.
Like, Georgia, New York will enforce liquidated damage provisions so long
as they do not constitute a penalty. It employs a two-part test for making the
analysis, and the first element of its test -- whether actual damagesaredifficult to

> In Pure Hospitality Sols. at 595-598, the Georgia Court of Appeals considered whether damages sought under a
convertible note were liquidated for purposes of default judgment under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(a). It did not address
any aspect of O.C.G.A.§ 13-6-7 orthe three-part Georgia analysis of how an enforceable liquidated damageprovision
differs from an unenforceablepenalty.
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determine — is similar to the first element of Georgia’s test. LG Capital Funding,

LLC v. CardioGenics Holdings, Inc., No. 16-CV-1215, 2018 WL 1521861, at *7
(E.D. N.Y. Feb. 2, 2018), Report and Recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 2057141,

at *3 (E.D. N.Y. Mar. 8, 2018) rev’d on other grounds, 787 F. App’x 2 (2d Cir.
2019); LG Capital Funding, LLC v. Accelera Innovations, Inc., No. 17-CV-1460,

2018 WL 5456670, at *9 (E.D. N.Y. August 13, 2018); LG Capital Funding, LLC v
SBarz Int’L., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d 84, 101 (2018); Union Capital, LLC v. Vape
Holdings, Inc., No. 16 Civ. 1343, 2017 WL 1406278, at *7 (S.D. N.Y. March 31,
2017). Like Georgia, New York law considers this element based on the time the
contract was executed, not when it was breached. Compare Turner v. Atlanta Girls’

School, Inc., 288 Ga. App. 115, 116-117 (2007) (difficulty of estimating damages
must exist at the time the contract was made,not at its breach) with LG Capitalv.

CardioGenics, at *10 (“in determining whether liquidated damagesare available, the
Court must examine the provision as of its date, not the breach”). Each of the
aforementioned New Yorkcases considered “make whole”provisions in convertible
notes, similar to the one at issue here, and each rejected the claim that the damages
were noteasily ascertainable.‘

4

LG Capital Funding v. CardioGenics at *7-9; LG Capital Funding v. Accelera Innovations, at *12; LG Capital

Funding v. 5BarzInt’l. at 103; Union Capital at *7.
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Like the plaintiff in LG Capital Funding v. CardioGenics, JPC argues the
actual damagesfor the failure to convert weredifficult to ascertain becauseall of the
pertinent factors were unknown at the time the Note was issued — when the
conversion would occur, the amountofthe conversion and/orthe tradingprice of the
stock. (Plaintiff's Resp. to Defendant’s Mot., p. 7.) However, the New York court
determined all of these factors simply suggest the amount of damages could vary
widely, not that the damages were difficult to ascertain. Because “the quantum is
unknown does not make the damages difficult to determine.” Id. at *8 (punctuation
omitted.)

As noted in LG Capital Funding v. Accelera Innovations, “[d]Jetermining

the damages in the event of a failure to deliver converted shares was no more
complicated or ephemeral than the method of calculating the conversion in thefirst
place.” Id. at *12. Likewise, in Georgia, the measure of damages incurred because

of Cuentas’s failure to timely comply with the Notice of Conversion is readily
ascertainable as outlined in Brandt. Brandt at 519. Applying this same reasoning,
the Court finds both the Make Whole Remedy Default Conversion Formula do not
comport withthe first element of the Georgia test.
Under the second element of the Georgia test, an enforceable liquidated
damage provision must be intended to assess damages andnotinflict a penalty.
“[Georgia] ascertain[s] the intent of the parties by first looking to the language of
the contract. Although the words used bythe parties are not conclusive, they are a
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significant factor in determining the parties’ intent.” West _Asset Mgmt. at 785
(citations omitted.) Unlike the Failure to Deliver Daily Penalty, which was expressly
described as a penalty, the Noteis silent as to the intent of the Make Whole Remedy
or the Default Conversion Formula, not indicating whether they were intended as
liquidated damagesorpenalties.
Looking outside the Note, the Court finds no evidence the parties intended
these remedies to function as liquidated damages in the sense contemplated by
O.C.G.A. § 13-6-7 and corresponding Georgia law. Further, JPC’s December 1,
2017 demand letter, and the subsequent deposition testimony of its 30(b)(6)
representative, who actively negotiated the Note, clearly and expressly reflect JPC
always envisioned these remedies as penalties.

(Canouse Aff., J] 124-140;

Defendant’s SUMF, Ex. 6 at pp. 122-125; 211-215; Ex. 10)

As its corporate

representative testified,
JPC: [t]he penalties are specifically [in the Note] to encourage [Cuentas] to
act responsibly ....
Q:

The penalties are there to make sure the companypays. Right?

JPC: To makesure they do whatthey agreedto do.

(Id., Ex. 6, p. 123.)
The Court finds the Make Whole Remedy and Default Conversion Formula
were intended to penalize Cuentas for breaching the Note.
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Furthermore, the third element of the Georgia test requires the Court to
consider whether a liquidated damageprovision is a reasonable pre-estimate of the
loss. Although worded differently this element is substantially similar to the second
elementof the New Yorktest, which considers whetherthe liquidated damagesare
disproportionate to the potential loss. LG Capital Funding v. CardioGenics, at *7.
The similarity of these two elementsis reflected in LG Capital Funding v. Accelera
Innovations which, in discussing New York’s proportionality analysis, explained,
“[a]n enforceable liquidated damagesclauseis an estimate, made bytheparties at
the time they enter into their agreement, of the extent of the injury that would be
sustained as a result of breach of the agreement.” Id. at *12 (punctuation omitted)
citing Truck Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Puritan Farms 2", Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 420, 424

(N.Y. 1977).
With regard to the Make Whole Remedy, the Court is again persuaded by the
reasoning employedin the line of New Yorkcasesas to whythethird elementofthe
Georgiatest has not been met. Union Capital at *7. The Make Whole Remedy gives
JPC total control overif and whento exercise the remedy and provides JPC with the
highest market price on any date subsequent to the failure to convert. Thus, the
Make Whole Remedyis “designed to provide [JPC] with a guaranteed higher cash
payout than a true make-whole measure, which would focus only on [JPC’s] loss as

a result of [Cuentas’s] failure to abide by the termsofits bargain . . . [T]he so called
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‘Make-Whole’ provision of the Note is nothing of the sort and is instead an
unenforceable penalty.” Id.
Additionally, the Court finds the Default Conversion Formula -- which adds
ten percent to the conversion discountprice, and five days to the lookback period,
and eliminates the share price floor -- does not reflect a reasonable pre-estimate of
JPC’s damagesbased upon Cuentas’s failure to timely convert. Asto this element,
“the touchstone question is whetherthe parties employed a reasonable method under
the circumstancesto arrive at a sum that reasonably approximates the probable loss.”
Mariner Health Care Mgmt. Co. v. Sovereign Healthcare, LLC, 306 Ga. App. 873,
876 (2010)(citation and punctuation omitted.)
JPC asserts the Default Conversion Formula only imposes “modest
adjustments” to the Standard Conversion Formula, concluding “[t]his is reasonable
given the additional risk to which an eventof default leaves a convertible note holder
exposed.” (Plaintiff's Resp. to Defendant’s Mot., pp. 14-15; Canouse Aff., J 136137; 158-159, and 176-178.) JPC also argues these types of adjustments comport
with industry standards. (Plaintiff's Resp. to Defendant’s Mot., p. 12; Canouse Aff.,
{| 65-68.) JPC’s arguments miss the point of Mariner. The question posed by the
third element is not to determine whether there was a reasonable purpose for the
Default Conversion Formula but whether “the parties employed a reasonable
method” for estimating the loss when arriving at the Default Conversion Formula.
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Mariner, at 876. In Mariner, specific evidence reflected that the lost profits allowed

in the subject liquidated damages provision very closely mirrored actual profit
margin in the contract, thus supporting the determination that the method for
approximating the probable loss was reasonable. Id. In this case, as in Daniels v.
Johnson, 191 Ga. App. 70, 72 (1989) (citations omitted), the liquidated damages
provision is unenforceable because, “[i]t is clear that the parties did not make a bona
fide effort to liquidate in advance and agree upon the sum which should represent
the damages which would beactually sustained in the event of a breach.”
For these reasons, the Court finds the Note’s Make Whole Remedy and

Default Conversion Formula are unenforceable.
Having determined these two remedial provisions are unenforceable, the
Court has considered JPC’s request that, pursuant to the Note, “such provision[s]
shall be adjusted rather than voided, if possible, so that [they are] enforceableto the
maximum extentpossible.” (Note § 9; Plaintiff's Resp. to Defendant’s Mot., pp. 1617.) Assuming without deciding that Georgia empowers a court to modify the
unenforceable provisions of a written contract, based uponthe facts ofthis case, the
Court doesnot find any modification could breathelife into either of these remedies.
Asoutlined in the analysisofthe first element of Georgia’s test, the damages caused
by failure to deliver stock are easily measured and are not a proper subject for
liquidated damagesprovision. Further, as to the second element, the Court cannot
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ignore these two provisions were intendedas penalties and while the Court may have
the ability to modify contract language, there is no wayit can modify a party’s intent.
Finally, Georgia law clearly provides that if a liquidated damages provision is
unenforceable, recovery is limited to “the amounts of damages actually shown.”
West Asset Mgmt. at 785. Accordingly, the Court findsit is not “nossible” to alter
these liquidated damageprovisionsin a way as to make them enforceable. (Note, §
9.)
3.3 Default Interest
3.3.1 Default Interest is Not a Species ofLiquidated Damages
Cuentas makeslittle effort to independently consider the Note’s Default
Interest provision in its three-part liquidated damagesanalysis, and the Court is not
convinced the Note’s allowance for Default Interest is properly analyzed as a
liquidated damages provision. Under Georgia law,parties are able to contract as to
their interest rate so long as therate is not usurious. In pertinent part, O.C.G.A. § 74-2(a)(1)(A) provides: “/n/otwithstanding the provisions of other laws to the
contrary, except Code Section 7-4-18 [criminal penalty for excessive interest
>
The Court is mindful that convertible notes may be considered an innovative way of financing early-stage
companiesthat can be inherently risky but occasionally very lucrative for investors. (Coyle Aff., 4 3; Canouse Aff.,
4] 21-46). Georgia’s law of liquidated damages doesnotspecifically contemplate these types of contracts, andit is
not within the Court’s purview to determine whether these types of contracts may be desirable or manipulate
longstanding law so as to accommodatethis form of contract. The decision about whether these types of contracts
should be encouraged and,if so, how the law should be crafted to address their unique damage issues, are questions
to be answered by the Georgia Assembly. See generally Commonwealth Inv. Co. v. Frye, 219 Ga. 498, 499 (1963)
(“thelegislature, and not the courts, are empoweredby the Constitution to decide public policy, and to implementthat
policy by enacting laws; andthe courts are boundto follow such lawsif constitutional.”)
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statute], the parties may establish by written contract any rate ofinterest, expressed
in simple interest terms as of the date of the evidence of the indebtedness... .”
(Emphasissupplied.)’ As a provision of Georgia law “contrary” to O.C.G.A. § 7-42(a)(1)(A), the Court finds the liquidated damagesanalysis implicated by O.C.G.A.
§13-6-7 does not apply to the Note’s Default Interest provision.
The Court finds support for this conclusion in MMA Capital Corp. v. ALR
Oglethorpe, LLC, 336 Ga. App. 360 (2016). In MMACapital, the Georgia Court of
Appeals determined that a default interest rate was not a penalty under O.C.G.A.
§13-6-7. While it outlined the three-part test for evaluating a liquidated damages
provision, it did not perform an analysis of the three factors.

Instead, it only

considered the more general question posed by the liquidated damagesanalysis of
whether the default interest provision could be considered a penalty, determining it
wasnot and noting it had found noprior authority on the question. Id. at 363-364.
It reasoned, “[w]e have previously affirmed summary judgments to lenders even
whenthepost-default interest rate was substantially higher than the pre-default rate”
specifically citing Dawson Pointe, LLC v. Sun Trust Bank, 312 Ga. App. 338 (2011)
whereit had upheld a judgmentgranting post-default interest at 18% over the prime
rate while the pre-default interest rate was only .25% over prime. Id. at 364.

° Here, the Note expressly providesthat if the Default Interestrate “is usurious or not permitted by currentlaw,then
[Default Interest shall accrue] at the highest rate of interest permitted by law.” (Note, §8.) Here, Cuentas has not
argued the Default Interest rate is usurious.
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The Court finds the Note’s provision for Default Interest complies with
Georgia law permitting parties to contract on an interest rate and doesnotconstitute
an unenforceable penalty.
3.3.2 Calculation ofPotential Default Interest Damages and Cuentas’s
Allegations of Waiver

First, the Court considers what Default Interest damages JPC might recover.
Asoutlined above, while establishing the sameprocess for each, the Note considered
the conversion of principal and interest as separate concerns. The Note permits
interest, and by extension Default Interest, to accrue solely on the outstanding
principal. (Note, p. 1; § 4(b).) Specifically, the Note provides, “[t]he dollar amount
converted into Interest Shares shall be all or a portion of the accrued interest
calculated on the unpaid principal balance of this Note to the date of such notice.”
(Id., § 4(b).) The April 27, 2017 Notice of Conversion converted the entire principal
balance $70,000.00. Thus, as JPC recognizes, interest ceased accruing as of April
27, 2017.7 (Plaintiff's Br. in Support of Mot., pp. 13-14.)
That same Notice of Conversion also converted “accrued” interest of
$1,764.38 calculated per the non-default rate for the duration of the Note. However,

JPC now claimsthatit is entitled to $5,293.14 ofinterest on the outstanding principal
balance calculated per the Default Interest rate for the same time period because

7 This is consistent with the general purpose of a convertible note that permits a holder to convert his debt into equity.
In this scenario, interest should stop accruingat the time the debt is converted.
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Cuentas was in default of its Share Reserve obligations from the time it issued the
Note. (Id.) Thus, the question is whether JPC is owed an additional $3,528.76 in
Default Interest.
Cuentas contends JPC waived any breach regarding Cuentas’s failure to
maintain the required Share Reserve by not objecting in early February 2017 when:
(1) it was first made aware of the Share Reserve’s deficiency, and more importantly,
after it indisputably received actual knowledge of Cuentas’s breach and (2) it
accepted the 3,600,720 shares as full payment. (Resp. to Plaintiff's Motion, pp. 28). JPC contends no waiver exists absent a writing as required under the Note.
(Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Mot., pp. 6-7; Note, §§ 8 and 10.)
[W]aiver of a contract provision may be express, or may be inferred from

actions, conduct, or a course of dealing. Put another way, waiver of

a contract right may result from a party’s conduct showing his election
between twoinconsistent rights. . . [A]ll of the attendantfacts, taken together,
must amountto an intentional relinquishment of a knownright, in order that
a waiver may exist. But significantly, when the evidenceis in conflict, the
issue of waiver must be decided by the jury. Importantly, an anti-waiver
provision in a contract can also be waived.
BCM Constr. Grp., LLC v. Williams, 353 Ga. App. 811, 815 (2020)(citations
omitted.)
The Court finds clear and unequivocalevidenceofan intentional waiver. The
Note provides for non-default interest and Default Interest. The two are inconsistent
in that, at any point while principal remains outstanding, the holder of the Noteis
entitled to one or the other, not both. The affidavit of the JCP agent who negotiated
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the Note and represented JCP in all aspects of the conversion process indicates he
was a sophisticated investor who had a great deal of experience with convertible
notes. (Canouse Aff., {J 7-17.) The lengthy email exchange between him, Cuentas,
and the transfer agent demonstrates JPC was specifically made aware of the breach
on April 17, 2017; with knowledge of the breach JPC recalculated its conversion

amountsto include additionalinterest that had accruedontheprincipal balance using
the non-default interest rate; JPC expressly brought the breach to Cuentas’s attention
on June 30, 2017, and,in that very sameemail, it asked Cuentasto fully honor JPC’s

April 27, 2017 Notice of Conversion which wascalculated using the non-default
interest rate.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds JPC fully converted all interest that
had accrued on the Note’s outstandingprincipal using the non-default rate of 8% and
intentionally relinquished any right to subsequently seek additional interest on that
same outstanding balance during the same time period using the more lucrative
Default Interest rate.
3.4

Plaintiff's Other Claimsfor Relief

Defendant’s Motion seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs alternate claim
for specific performance which seeks to compel Cuentasto issue stock shares to JPC.
(Brief in Support of Defendant’s Mot., pp. 17-18). See generally O.C.G.A. § 23-2130 (“Specific performance ofa contract, if within the power ofthe party, will be
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decreed, generally, whenever the damages recoverable at law would not be an
adequate compensation for nonperformance.”)

The Court agrees the equitable

doctrine of specific performanceis inapplicable to the present dispute because JPC
has an adequate remedy at law. Id. As discussed abovein the analysis of liquidated
damages, a party is entitled to recover actual damagesforthe failure to timely deliver
stock shares. See Brandt at 519.

Because JPC’s substantive claims are subject to summary judgment, its
derivative claims for attorney’s fees also fail. Oconee Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Brown, 351 Ga. App. 561, 576 (2019).
4. CONCLUSION
For all the above-stated reasons,it is hereby ordered that Defendant’s Motion is
GRANTEDandPlaintiff's Motion is DENIED.

SO ORDEREDthis 7th day of October, 2020.

/s/ Kelly Lee Ellerbe
JUDGE KELLY LEE ELLERBE

Superior Court of Fulton County

Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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